We consider the decentralized provision of a global public good with local externalities in a spatially explicit model. Communities decide on the location of a facility that benets everyone but exhibits costs to the host and its neighbors. They share the costs through transfers. We examine the cooperative game associated with this so-called NIMBY (Not In My Back-Yard") problem. We derive and discuss conditions for core solutions to exist. These conditions are driven by the temptation to exclude groups of neighbors at any potential location. We illustrate the results in dierent spatial settings. In particular, we construct a hypothetical example on a real administrative unit in which the core is shown to be empty. These results clarify how property rights can aect cooperation and shed further light on a limitation of the Coase theorem.
Introduction
The production of activities that are harmful to society is the source of a famous controversy between Arthur Pigou and Ronald Coase. In such a context, Pigou recommended that the producers pay the harmful damages inicted on third parties. Using the example of the sparks from railway engines that set re to woods surrounding the tracks, Pigou (1920) argued that the railways should be forced to compensate those whose woods are burnt. In the same example, Coase (1960) challenged the Pigouvian solution. He argued that the parties involved could resolve the problem themselves in the absence of transaction costs, provided the property rights on harmful externalities (or liability rules) were assigned to one of them. Such Coasean bargaining would lead to eciency, regardless of the allocation of property rights. This is known as the Coase Theorem.
The Coase theorem was subsequently invalidated in cooperative settings involving more than two players. A famous instance is a version of the Shapley and Shubik garbage game (1969) , in which three neighbors decide on where to dump their garbage. For instance, let the disutility of having waste in one's backyard be -1 for one bag of garbage and -2 both for 2 and 3 bags of garbage. When utility is transferable, the ecient outcome is for the three agents to cooperate and to locate the garbage in the backyard of one of them. The total disutility so achieved is -2. Coasean bargaining predicts that, in the absence of transaction costs, they will exchange garbage and money to reach such a socially optimal outcome. Yet, if a player has the right to dispose of garbage as she or he likes, every group of two players will prefer to dump their garbage into the third player's garden without compensating her or him. In the previous example, one can easily check that whatever way they share the total cost, there will always be a couple of players willing to withdraw and coordinate their dumping on the third player: this game has an empty core.
1 More generally, Starrett (1973) pointed out that economies with nonconvexities can have an empty core. Aivazian and Callen (1981) make a similar argument: they provide an example with a polluting facility for which the core in the cooperative game representing Coasean bargaining with a specic liability rule is empty.
2 Although the above examples do show that the Coase theorem cannot always be demonstrated, they do not tell us in which circumstances the Coase theorem is likely to hold. This paper lls that gap. Using quite a general model of production activities with negative externalities, we investigate what the driving economic parameters are that determine whether the core is empty.
To do so, we deal with a spatial model with externalities. It represents the problem of providing a locally undesirable but globally desirable facility. In Pigou's story on sparks from railway engines, all citizens connected to the railways benet from it, but those who own wood along the track might suer from the externality cost. This is the well-known Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) problem. Examples include waste treatment plants, nuclear or coal power utilities, windmills, airports, prisons or, more recently, shale gas wells.
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Such facilities are acknowledged to be socially benecial in the sense of the Hicks-Kaldor 1 The total disutility that such a two-player coalition can guarantee to itself is at least -1: both members drop their garbage on the third player but may still get his or her garbage. Additionally, the disutility of the third agent, is -2, hence the total disutility is -3: social eciency is not achieved. Hence, players may not be able to reach an ecient outcome.
2 The argument is reproduced by Stearns (1993) with voting instead of bargaining as a collective decision process. In his example, a Condorcet cycle arises in a situation where three communities have to collectively decide where to site a nuclear waste repository.
3 Some of these projects feature non-excludability of the benets at the origin of free-riding behaviors; others not. We will emphasize here the garbage game dimension of such problems, which is common to all. criterion: the social benets more than oset the social costs. Yet their provision meets strong opposition from neighboring citizens who suer from negative externalities such as air or water pollution, noise, or amenity losses.
4 This is why the localization of the facility is a sensitive issue. Some form of compensation should be oered to make it acceptable to the neighboring victims of externality costs. In this paper we examine the decentralized provision of a locally undesirable facility.
The NIMBY problem is rst studied in its general form. Several communities plan to build a facility. The benets from using the facility are excludable and non-rival. The costs are incurred by the host and its neighbors. The communities both agree on location and transfers: they decide on who is going to host the facility and how much the host and its neighbors must be compensated. Coalitions of communities block the agreement if they are better-o building and sharing their own facility (or not building at all). The outside option of coalitions denes a cooperative game associated with the NIMBY problem. Interestingly, the cooperative game exhibits specic properties. It is a cooperative game with externalities in the sense that the welfare that a group of communities can enjoy depends on the cooperative behavior of communities outside the group as well as the localization of the facility they build on their own. Yet externalities in the associated cooperative game can be negative or positive: a group of communities can benet or suer from the cooperation of others. Nevertheless, the best that can happen for a coalition of communities is that the other communities are not cooperating. We rst dene the value function of our cooperative game accordingly: a group of communities do not expect that the others will build their own facility when they oppose an agreement. We thus give maximal incentives for coalitions to deviate and block an agreement. Under some assumptions, we show that only two forces constrain the core: individual rationality and the exclusion of individual communities and communities in the neighborhood of any potential host of the facility. Individual rationality makes sure that all communities benet from the facility. The motive for exclusion is similar to that in Shapley and Shubik's garbage game: communities are tempted to exclude those who suer from the negative externality, to avoid compensating them. Thus we restrict considerably the set of inequalities dening the core.
We next propose an index for testing if the core is empty or not. This corresponds to the least-core value of an associated cooperative game. The core is non-empty if and only if such an index is lower than one. We discuss some comparative static properties of the least-core index. We show that the core is less likely to be empty when externality costs increase everywhere except for the optimal location of the facility. Intuitively, this means that the more harmful the project is when located elsewhere than at the optimal location, the easier it is for the communities to reach an agreement. We also show that the problem is exacerbated when the number of communities increases in the linear case. However, the eect of the number of communities is ambiguous in general. Next, we generalize our results for other notions of the core. We nally provide illustrations on dierent spatial structures, rst in the linear case and on simple graphs. Lastly, we compute the index for a French administrative unit to illustrate its potential relevance for real-world NIMBY problems. The central planner can impose the mechanism on the communities but does not know their cost. The implemented solution does not guarantee that some communities could not do better by providing the facility by themselves. In contrast, we assume that the cost of hosting the facility is common knowledge and adopt a cooperative approach. Decisions are decentralized to communities that collectively negotiate and can make binding agreements about localization and compensations.
In a cooperative framework, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2010), Sakai (2012) and De- hez (2013) have analyzed core solutions of cooperative games associated with NIMBY problems.
5 They all implicitly rely on the assumption that externalities are concentrated within a jurisdiction. In practice, pollution (e.g. air or water pollution, risk of radioactive contamination) spreads out quite widely compared to the size of the communities (e.g. municipalities, countries). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to explicitly introduce spatial externalities in a cooperative framework representing the NIMBY problem. It emphasizes the diculties that arise when the costs are spread over more than a single community.
Our paper is related to the literature on public good provision which emphasizes the freeriding problem: users can benet from public goods without contributing to their cost (see e.g. Bergstrom and al., 1986 ). Free-riding arises when people cannot be excluded from consuming the good. We avoid free-riding by assuming that communities can be excluded from accessing the facility at no cost. However, the potential exclusion of the neighbors of any potential host can still compromise cooperation. Both the NIMBY and public good provision cooperative games are games with externalities. This raises interesting conceptual issues for the denition of the core and the representation of the game in partition form (see e.g. Ray and Vohra, 2001) . Such issues are discussed in Section 4.
Spatial dimensions have been introduced for the provision of public and excludable facilities. In Goemans and Skutella (2004), consumers have heterogeneous costs of being connected to the facility and dier on the benet they enjoy using the facility, depending on its location. They provide conditions for the core to be non-empty. In Le Breton and Weber (2003), both the users and the facility are located along a line. The benet of using the facility is proportional to the distance between the user and the facility called transportation" cost. In this model, preferences are single-peaked, in the sense that the closer the facility, the better for the user. This hypothesis plays a crucial role for the existence of core allocations. In contrast, preferences can be single-dipped in the linear representation of our model. Hence, the motive for blocking a global agreement is dierent: coalitions would like to avoid compensating the neighbors of the community hosting the facility. As a consequence, non-emptiness of the core is no longer guaranteed.
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5 Lejano and Davos (2001) also consider coalition formation in the NIMBY problem. In a numerical example, they argue that a compensation scheme that leaves the host indierent may fail to be a core allocation.
6 Note that Barberà et al. (2012) and Manjunath (2013) have examined single-dipped preferences for the location of an indivisible bad. They deal with non-transferable utility (no money involved) whereas we assume transferable utility: players can transfer part of their welfare through side-payments. Their focus is on the localization of the public bad with strategy-proof rules. In contrast, we abstract for information The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general NIMBY cooperative game with excludable benets. Section 3 presents the main result. In Section 4
we discuss the robustness of this result when externalities are considered in the denition of the cooperative game. Finally, Section 5 provides illustrations of the main result on explicit spatial structures. 2 The NIMBY cooperative game A set N = {1, ..., n} (n > 1) of communities or agents (land owners, municipalities, cities, regions, countries, etc.) might decide to launch a facility such as a waste treatment plant, a utility (nuclear or coal power plant) or a polluting factory. Each community i ∈ N enjoys an individual benet b i ≥ 0 from using the facility. Benets are non-rival and non-cumulative: once a community has access to a facility, it does not enjoy any additional benet from accessing a second one. Yet the communities that launch a facility can exclude the others from using it. A facility is therefore a club good: a non-rival and excludable good. A facility generates local nuisances to the host and its immediate neighbors (pollution, risk of accident or contamination, etc.). This is summarized by the matrix of externality costs C = (c ij ) (i,j)∈N 2 where c ij ≥ 0 denotes the costs incurred by community j by a facility located at i. We call c ii the host cost for every i ∈ N and c ij the externality cost for any i = j. Community j is a neighbor of community i if and only if c ij > 0. The matrix C provides a spatial representation of the problem. 
Example. Uniform linear NIMBY problems
Throughout the article, we will consider a particular illustrative NIMBY problem: the uniform linear case. A NIMBY is linear if it can be represented by a line in which a link between communities represents externality costs c ij . In a line, each community has a neighbor, except the ones at the two ends. If we order communities according to their location from 1 to n, it means that the externality costs are c jj+1 > 0 for j = 1 to n − 1. A uniform NIMBY problem is characterized by uniform benets and costs. The benet per community is denoted by b so that b = be where e = (1, ..., 1). The host cost is c and the externality cost is δc for the neighbors of the host, where δ is a positive parameter reecting the share of the host's cost that spreads to the neighboring communities. problems so that the public bad can easily be eciently located. In our setting, localization impacts the value that a deviating coalition can achieve. It thus determines the distribution of the welfare through side-payments. 7 We insist on the interpretation of δ as the share of a neighbor's pollution cost as compared to the host's total cost. Formally, the latter is the sum of a technical cost ct (construction, management, etc.) and a pollution cost cp. If α denotes the multiplicative change in the pollution cost for the immediate neighbors, the additional cost for each of them is αcp. We then get δ = α cp c t +cp . So δ captures the decrease of pollution costs with distance, as well as the share of pollution costs in the hosts's total costs.
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The cost matrix of a linear uniform NIMBY problem is: 
The strict neighborhoods are
In the uniform linear setting, it is ecient to build the facility at one end of the line. The total welfare so achieved is nb − (1 + δ)c. We will use some further notations. For any set of communities S ⊆ N let b(S) = S b i be the total benet enjoyed by S from running a facility. While the total benet does not depend on the location of the facility in S, total costs do. Let us denote by c(S) the lowest total cost that the members of S incur by building and running a facility. We have c(S) = min i∈S j∈S c ij . A facility should be built if the total benet exceeds the total cost when located optimally. We assume that b(N ) > c(N ): it is ecient to build at least one facility in the grand coalition. Obviously, since a facility is non-rival and benets are non-cumulative, it is ecient to build only one facility used by all communities in N . The total benet from building a facility optimally located is thus b(N ) − c(N ). In addition, we assume b i < c ii for every i ∈ N : it is never ecient for a community to launch a facility alone. Therefore some minimal cooperation of two communities is needed to build a facility. A coalition S ⊂ N is called a building coalition if b(S) ≥ c(S) and a nonbuilding coalition otherwise. We denote by h ∈ argmin i∈N j∈N c ij an optimal location in N . There may be several optimal locations or hosts h for a given problem σ. Let H denote the set of all optimal hosts H ≡ argmin i∈N j∈N c ij . Finally, we will denote by
} the set of the subsets of all strict neighborhoods and
The communities agree on a location of the facility h and a way to share the net benet from using it. An allocation is a vector x = (x i ) i=1,...,n where x i denotes community i's benet with:
An allocation of the total net benet v(N ) is induced by budget-balanced transfers t = (t i ) i=1,...,n with n i=1 t i = 0. The host h enjoys a welfare of x h = b h −c hh +t h where t h is the compensation received from hosting the facility. Its neighbors j obtain x j = b j − c hj + t j . They are thus paid t j for the nuisances. Other communities i ∈ N \N (h) get x i = b i + t i , thereby paying −t i to nance the compensations t h +
An allocation is in the core of the NIMBY problem σ if it is not blocked by any coalition. We say a coalition S ⊂ N blocks a distribution of the welfare if its members can achieve a higher welfare by themselves. We need to gure out what a coalition S can achieve by building and running its own facility. It depends on its own behavior and on the behavior of the communities in N \S. Indeed, by agreeing to build a facility close to some members of S, the communities outside S can exert a negative externality on S, hence reducing its value.
Technically, the cooperative game induced by the NIMBY problem exhibits externalities:
the worth or value of a coalition S depends on the behavior of outside communities. For instance, if the communities outside S agree to build a facility, a member of S who adjoins the facility might suer from a negative externality and S would experience a welfare loss.
We assume that if a coalition S builds a facility, communities outside S do not build any. Such an assumption is in line with the notion of γ-core whereby communities outside a coalition S play their individual best reply strategies (Chander and Tulkens, 1997). Here, since it is too costly for a single community to build its own facility, its best individual strategy is not to build. Furthermore, it gives higher incentives for a coalition S to block a global agreement since, when doing so, members of S do not anticipate any negative externalities from neighboring facilities. We will discuss this assumption in Section 4.
Under such an assumption, the value or worth of coalition S ⊂ N is:
A core allocation is thus dened as follows: Denition 1. An allocation x is in the core C if it satises i∈N x i = v(N ) and the following core lower bounds:
The core is dened by a large number of inequality constraints. Some are binding, others are not. In the next section we show that the problem can be reduced under some assumptions.
We propose a simple formula for an index related to the non-emptiness of the core: the least core value.
Existence of core allocations
We introduce several assumptions which aim at simplifying the problem. The rst one is related to the benet achieved by a coalition formed by excluding a single community or members of a common neighborhood.
Assumption 1. ∀S ∈N , b(N \S) ≥ c(N \S)
Assumption 1 implies that coalitions formed by excluding some neighbors of the same community would always build a facility. It holds for local externalities, i.e. when few municipalities are negatively impacted in realtion to the number of beneciaries. In the uniform linear case, it holds when excluding the neighbors of communities at the extremities of the line (1 and n), or the two neighbors of a middle-community i (with 1 < i < n), would not prevent the remaining communities from building a facility. The rst requirement is met when (n − 1)b ≥ c while the second holds true when (n − 2)b ≥ c. 8 The last inequality provides a condition on the parameters n, b and c such that Assumption 1 holds in the uniform linear case.
Assumption 2. The optimal host is not unique: |H| > 1. 
Proposition 1 claries what constrains core allocations. Condition (1) is the eciency condition. Condition (2) captures individual rationality: as we assume any single community anticipates no external cost from its withdrawing, it should be guaranteed 0 in core allocations. In regard to this lower bound on individual allocations, Condition (3) imposes a higher bound on individual allocations: the rationality of the coalitions of size n-1 ensures that no agent can be subsidized in the grand coalition. From Assumption 2, this requirement also holds for the host. Finally, Condition (4) reects the possible exclusion of the host's neighbors: by excluding some neighbors of a potential host, a coalition disregards part of the externality costs of the facility. Note that, eventhough it is not taken into account by the remaining coalition, the excluded communities could still suer from the externality costs. Due to such possibility of costless exclusion, the welfare of the host's neighbors is bounded upward. The point is that the upper bounds should not only hold for the actual host's neighbors, but also for all potential host's neighbors. Therefore, a coalition S of neighbors of a same community should contribute to the project at least to the extent of the cost saved by excluding them, that is, c(N ) − c(N \S). We need this 8 In the rst case, excluding a community at the extremity of the line allows a cost δc to be saved so that the total cost incurred by the coalition which excludes 1 or n is (1 + δ)c. Yet the coalition loses the benet b from the excluded community so that the total benet is (n − 1)b. In the second case, by excluding two communities that are neighbors of a middle-community i, the coalition can save the two externality costs 2δc by locating the facility at i, although they loose the benet of the two neighbors from using the facility so that the total benet is (n − 2)b.
condition to hold for every coalition of neighbors of a same community, that is for all coalitions in
We note that these constraints can be stringent enough to undermine the existence of core allocations: when exclusion is protable enough, the allocation of the full value of the facility could be impossible in the grand coalition as such constraints would require the collection of more than the total cost of the project. The understanding we get from Proposition 1 leads us to a general statement about the existence of the core in NIMBY games. The following condition will be imposed. Assumption 3. ∀i ∈ N, b i ≥ max j∈N \{i} c ji Assumption 3 states that the cost borne by a community when the facility is located at one of its neighbor's never surpasses its own benet. In the uniform linear case, this means that b ≥ δc: the externality cost is bounded by the benet of using the facility. In this specic case, we note that b ≥ δc is a necessary condition for the core not to be empty as we know that community 2 would have a maximum welfare of b − δc, which is negative when the condition is not met. This assumption is made in order to focus on cases for which individual rationality is not a source of emptiness of the core. We will see in Section 4 that it can be relaxed when considering more general notions of the core.
The following Proposition provides a simple test for non-emptiness of the core, involving the additive least-core value I(C) of the game. Conceptually, the additive least-core value (Maschler et al, 1979 ) quanties the necessary decrease in all core lower bounds for the core to be non-empty. 9 This is a combinatorial problem which is dicult to solve in general. Yet the computational complexity of I(C) is greatly reduced as compared to the general problem of the existence of the core: it restricts the set of constraints to consider from 2 n to less than 2 max i∈N |N (i)| . As we will see in the following example and in Section 5, it can be computed for specic spatial structures.
This index also has a natural interpretation. If I(C) does not exceed 1, there exists at least one localization of the facility and an allocation of the net benet that is immune to 9 A collection B of coalitions is said to be balanced if and only if there exist strictly positive weights
blocking: the provision of the facility can be decentralized in the economy. If I(C) exceeds 1, no such allocation exists. In either case, the index has a quantitative interpretation: it quanties the maximal decrease in the costs c ii at all locations i ∈ N that the problem can sustain. An index of 0.8 indicates that at most 20% of the total cost in N could be withdrawn to the cost at any location and the core would remain non-empty. An index of 1.2 indicates that at least 20% of the total cost in N should be added to the cost at any location for the core to be non-empty.
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The index I(C) allows us to perform comparative statics in the general case of NIMBY games.
Proposition 3. The least core index I(C) weakly increases when C decreases while the minimal cost in the grand coalition is unchanged.
The proof of Proposition 3 is developed in Appendix E. It may appear surprising at rst sight: when costs decrease everywhere but at the host, the core shrinks. The reason is that a decrease in the costs which leaves the costs at the host unchanged, increases the protability of the deviation for all coalitions. As a result, I(C) weakly increases: the core is more likely to be empty. An illustration will be provided in Section 5.1 for the case of graphs. In the linear case, the number of communities n also causes the leastcore value I(C) to increase. However, this result does not generalize to all problems. A counterexample will be provided in Section 5.1.
Example. A rst illustration of Proposition 2 can be provided in the uniform linear case.
In such problems, an explicit computation of I(C) (detailed in Appendix D) leads to a higher bound on the parameter δ which depends only on the parameter n, as stated in the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the core of the uniform linear NIMBY problem (n, b, c, δ) is non-empty if and only if
Hence, for any number of communities there exists a critical level of δ above which the core is empty or, for any δ there exists a critical number of communities above which the core is empty.
A cooperative game with externalities
The results of the previous section stand for a notion of the core which relies on a coalition's anticipation that outside members will not build any project. In some cases, it may 10 Other meaningful quantities could be built in this context. A recent proposal, the cost of stability (Bachrach et al, 2009 ), quanties by how much the cost associated with all coalitions except the grand coalition N should be increased at least so that the core in non-empty. The interpretation of such a value would be appealing in this setting as it would capture the minimal transaction cost associated with the formation of a blocking coalition S -or equivalently the minimal subsidy to the grand coalition -required to stabilize the grand coalition. However, as it does not have an explicit form in this context, we choose to focus on the additive least core value. We thank Michel Le Breton for pointing out this work.
11 Note that Assumption 2 is always satised in the uniform linear case. be unrealistic to assume such behaviors. For instance, a single community or a small coalition would more likely expect outside members to cooperate on building and sharing a facility. In this section, we examine alternative and plausible expectations on the behavior of outsiders that a coalition might form. In doing so, we generalize the result to other notions of the core.
As discussed above, the cooperative game induced by the NIMBY problem is a cooperative game with externalities: the value of any coalition S depends on the cooperative behavior of communities outside S and their related facility-building decisions. We now formalize the problem in partition form (Thrall and Lucas, 1963) . Let P(N ) be the set of all partitions of N . The cooperative behavior of communities is summarized by an element P of P(N ) where each element S of P is a coalition. The members of S jointly decide on whether to build a facility and on its location. Let us denote S's building decision by its location choice l ∈ S ∪ {0} where l = 0 if no facility is built. In a partition P = {S 1 , ..., S m }, each coalition of communities S i ∈ P picks one of its best location decisions l i . A rational location vector in partition P is a vector l = (l 1 , ..., l m ) where each decision l i minimizes the cost of the facility (the cost of hosting the facility and the externality costs within S i ).
Let us denote by L(P) the set of rational location decision vectors in the partition P. 12
They can be multiple due to potential indierence. For instance, in the linear homogeneous NIMBY problem with n = 5 communities and 2b < c ≤ 3b, the partition {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}} might implement two dierent location vectors (0, 3) and (0, 5). They are both rational. Yet (0, 5) is preferred to (0, 3) by coalition {1, 2} since in the rst case one of its members, namely community 2, will incur the negative externality cost δc.
In a standard approach, the value function of a game with externalities depends on the coalition S and the partition in which the coalition is embedded. In the NIMBY game, it also depends on the rational location vector. Hence, we dene the value in partition function form v as a function that assigns to every coalition S, partition P of N , and rational location vector l ∈ L(P), a real number v(S, P, l). It is the welfare achieved by coalition S embedded in the partition P with the rational location vector l on P. The value is then dened for any potential conguration in terms of partition and rational location decisions. Yet some of those congurations might still appear irrelevant because they are unlikely. We exclude those congurations by introducing the notion of restrictions. A restriction R is a mapping which assigns to each coalition S a doublet R(S) ∈ P(N )×L(P).
Such a function can be interpreted as the expectations of a deviating coalition regarding the behavior of outside members. The value of S under a restriction R is denoted v R (S) = v(S, R(S)). Expectations are taken as given here but they could be endogenized following the literature on dynamic coalition formation (see e.g. Chwe, 1995; Bloch, 1996; Ray and Vohra, 1997; Yi, 1997).
We now dene the core based on restriction functions. A coalition S in a partition P blocks a global agreement x under restriction R if it can achieve a higher welfare under such a restriction. An allocation belongs to the R-core of the cooperative game associated with the NIMBY problem, denoted C R , if it is not blocked by any coalition of N . Formally:
12 Two comments are called for here. First, our restricting the attention to the set of rational decisions is in contrast with the standard approach of the α-core and β-core which respectively consider what a coalition can achieve regardless of the behavior of outside members or when having the possibility to adjust to others actions. Consistently with a remark by Laont (1977) in the context of the garbage game, the α-core would never be empty in our context. Second, in our case, location decisions are independent.
Yet, in the case of non-excludable facilities, strategic interactions would arise among coalitions for the provision of facilities. Denition 2. Let R be a restriction. An agreement x is in the R-core C R if it satises i∈N x i = v(N ) and the following core lower bounds:
As an illustration, we propose to discuss two specic restrictions relying on polar assumptions on the behavior of outside members.
We call the rst restriction Collapse In Outside Cooperation (CIOC). When deviating from a global agreement by blocking an allocation, a coalition S expects that the remaining communities will not cooperate to build facilities. It is formally dened by: ∀S ⊂ N , R(S) = ({S, {i} i∈N \S }, l). Note that since communities outside S are singletons and that we assume that no community would build on its own, they never build. The location decision vector l boils down either to no-building at all, or to a single facility located inside S. If S builds a facility, there might be multiple optimal localizations of the facility in S. Yet, all these localizations lead to a single value v c (S) = b(S) − c(S). We then have v c (S) = max(0, b(S) − c(S)). This is the notion of the core that we have examined in the previous sections. It corresponds to the notion of the γ-core introduced in the context of public good games (see e.g. Chander and Tulkens, 1997).
The second restriction we consider corresponds to the delta assumption of full cooperation and its associated notion, the δ-core. We call this second restriction Rational Hostile Outside Cooperation (RHOC). It is formally dened by ∀S ⊂ N, R(S) = ({S, N \S}, l).
The expectations of a coalition S when considering blocking an allocation is that all the other players will cooperate and (potentially) build a facility. Moreover, coalition S expects that if the coalition N \S is indierent between dierent locations, it will locate it at the worst place from S's point of view. Formally, the RHOC value function for a coalition S is dened as v r (S) = min l∈L({S,N\S}) v(S, {S, N \S}, l).
We rst investigate the cooperative externalities in the NIMBY problem. A cooperative game exhibits positive (resp. negative) externalities if coalitions benet (resp. suer) from the cooperative behavior of players outside (De Clippel and Serrano, 2008) . It turns out that externalities in the cooperative game induced by the NIMBY problem can be either positive or negative. The following proposition links the value functions of the game in partition form, the CIOC and the RHOC restrictions.
Proposition 4. For any S ⊂ N , P S and l ∈ L(P),
We might have v(S, P, l) > v(S, P , l) or v(S, P, l) < v(S, P , l) when P is a ner partition of N including S.
First, the CIOC value is the highest possible value that a coalition can obtain by deviating from the global agreement. This is because a coalition can only be bothered by nuisances generated by the facilities built by outsiders. So the best that can happen for a coalition is that the outsiders do not build any facility which holds under CIOC.
Second, the RHOC value can be lower or higher than the value with other partitions. This can be shown by example in the 5-player uniform linear NIMBY problem. For 2b ≥ c the lowest value for coalition S = {2} would be achieved with P = {{2}; {1, 4}; {3, 5}} and location decisions (0, 1, 3) because S would undergo the externalities linked to 2 facilities instead of a single one in the case P = {{2}; {1, 4, 3, 5}}. This remark emphasizes the fact that full cooperation of outsiders is not the worst that can happen to a coalition.
Third, a coalition does not necessarily benet from the merger of other coalitions. For instance, S could experience a negative externality when two former non-building coalitions merge and build next to it. This would be the case in the homogeneous linear case with 5 communities when c ≤ 4b < 2c and P = {{2}; {1, 4}; {3, 5}}. The merger to P = {{2}; {1, 4, 3, 5}} would induce the construction of a facility at 1 and make the worth of {2} decrease.
As a consequence of Proposition 4, we know that for any restriction R, C c ⊆ C R . The CIOCcore is the most restrictive notion of a core as it amounts to considering that coalitions do not take into account the negative externality that outside members could exert on them.
Hence, the emptiness of the CIOC-core does not imply the emptiness of any restricted core. This leads us to question the generality of Proposition 2, and more especially to doubt whether the necessary character of the identied condition would extend to any restricted core. We actually show that this condition carries forward to any restriction, provided we additionally assume that neighborhoods are small enough so that they never build when excluded. This is the sense of Assumption 4.
Assumption 4. ∀S ∈N , b(S) < c(S)
Assumption 4 suces for any coalition of neighbors of a same community not to build a facility on their own.
It holds when the number of direct neighbors is limited as
compared to the minimal number of communities for which building a facility is ecient.
For instance, it does hold in the uniform linear case when a minimum of three communities is needed to build a facility, because each community has at most two neighbors. Formally, it requires that 2b < c, so that no neighborhood of a community would build on its own. 14 Assumption 3 will also be needed. Yet, it can be weakened to the following assumption. For this reason, our results apply to local pollution at the scale of N . 14 If two communities neighboring a community i with 1 < i < n share a facility, they incur the hosting cost but no externality cost for a benet of 2b.
for these constraints to be non-binding in a linear program related to the emptiness of the core. Hence, the results discussed earlier are robust to alternative specications of the behavior of outside members.
Before moving to the illustrative examples, we briey discuss the case of non-excludable benets. It includes for instance NIMBY problems such as shale gas wells or nuclear waste repositories. When benets are non-excludable, free-riding compromises the existence of core allocations in addition to exclusion: coalitions of communities are tempted to block a global agreement because they can benet from the facility without paying its cost.
However, deviating coalitions may be tempered by two forces. First, large coalitions would not rationally expect remaining communities to build a project by themselves. Hence, free-riding would aect the core lower bounds only for small coalitions. Second, a small deviating coalition may expect the project to be located at its borders when withdrawing from the grand coalition as its interests would no longer be taken into account. At rst sight, it would mitigate free-riding incentives. Free-riding never occurs under the CIOC hypothesis as it requires that any deviating coalition anticipate that outside members would not build a project. The RHOC core provides us with an interesting insight on this problem as it presupposes cooperation among remaining communities and the associated credible threat. Therefore, we focus on the RHOC-core. We focus on the linear case when benets are non-excludable.
Example. Let us consider the uniform linear case with n ≥ 6. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, the RHOC-core of a uniform linear NIMBY problem with at least six communities and non-excludable benets is empty. Indeed, for any RHOC-core allocation x, the core lower bound of the coalition N \{2} (respectively N \{n − 1}) requires x 2 ≤ b 2 − δc (resp. x n−1 ≤ b n−1 − δc). On the other hand, we know that the coalition N \{2, n − 1} is a building coalition due to Assumption 4. Hence the coalition {2, n − 1} can free-ride and its core lower bound is written x 1 + x n−1 ≥ b 1 + b n−1 − δc. The latter condition is not compatible with the other two conditions identied. Hence the RHOC-core is empty.
We conclude this part by insisting that the emptiness of the core in the non-excludable case is likely to stem from the interplay between free-riding incentives and the garbagegame dimension of the problem. The latter dimension puts a higher bound on the welfare of the neighborhoods. When benets are excludable, these small coalitions will often not get more in a core allocation than what they would achieve if they withdrew, even if they have to bear the threat imposed by the remaining communities. Therefore, even if credible threats exist, they would often fail to stabilize the grand coalition. In the following section we redirect the focus to the CIOC-core C in explicit spatial structures with excludable benets.
5 Illustrations on explicit spatial structures
Uniform NIMBY problems on graphs
The linear example developed previously put the emphasis on the eect of the number of individuals on the core. We propose here a natural extension of the linear case which allows us to investigate the eect of the spatial structure on the core. For a given NIMBY problem (N, b, C), we restrict our attention to NIMBY problems on graphs. As in the linear case, the cost of building the project at i is the same for all. However, it entails an identical additional cost δc on each of i's neighbors. Hence, the matrix of costs can be written C = cI n + δcG where I n is the identity matrix and G is the adjacency matrix of a simple graph (with values 0 on the diagonal). A NIMBY problem on a graph is fully characterized by parameters (N, b, c, δ, G).
Example. Figure 2 below represents the graph associated with the following cost matrix for n = 6: Indeed, from the linear graph A with 5 communities, the addition of a community on the extremity of the line to form graph B implies a decrease inδ(G). For a given δ, this is associated with a decrease in I(C). However, the further addition of a community to form graph C implies an increase inδ(G). at the same time. Finally, this assessment shows that the spatial structure is in itself an important source of variability for the set of core agreements. We propose to carry further the exercise on a real administrative unit.
A tentative assessment on real geographies
We now briey discuss how the least-core value could be estimated in real problems. The exercise is illustrative: we introduce a hypothetical problem in a real administrative geographical division.
More precisely, let's consider a hypothetical negotiation among municipalities for locating and funding a facility in the French département of Haute-Garonne. This project would yield a potentially heterogeneous benet to each municipality. As Proposition 2 emphasizes, we do not need precise knowledge of the benets, provided that Assumptions 1 and 3 are met. However, Assumption 2 does not hold in this environment. Hence, we rely on the modication of Proposition 2 established in Appendix C. It allows us to drop this assumption at the cost of a dierent, more realistic one and a slight modication of the expression of I(C). What matters most is the structure of costs. Assume that a facility could only be located at the centroid of each municipality
. Assume additionally that, wherever it
15 This exercise emphasizes a limitation in our model: in order to compute the cost matrix C, a hypothesis is built, a facility yields a uniform pollution cost within a xed radius from the site. For instance, Figure 5 shows, in red, an impacted area of 3 km around a facility located at the centroid of a given municipality i. Given our assumption of uniformity within the impacted area, the total pollution cost is directly proportional to the red area. Moreover, as Proposition 2 emphasizes, we do not need to specify absolute values to compute the index:
only relative values matter. Hence, c ii can be normalized to the area of the intersection of the red plain circle and i's territory, and c ij , to the area of the intersection between the red plain circle and j's territory. The matrix C is obtained by computing all such areas. Neighborhood sets and the optimal location are derived from the matrix C. We compute the least-core value I(C) for dierent radii. We note that the least-core value is always higher than 1, so the core is empty in all these cases. This illustrative exercise can be improved by including a better estimate of the costs of such a facility. The main diculty here being the use of plausible values for the perceived pollution costs. Any step in this direction would rely on a good understanding of the monetary as well as the non-monetary costs of such facilities. The resulting index would in particular be sensitive to the cost at the optimal site, which, in this illustration, was to be at some indentation of the boundary.
has to be made on where the facility would be located within a given municipality regardless of the coalition it belongs to. In our assessment, we chose the centroids. In a more general framework, we could expect coalitions to have some exibility in the location choice. By increasing the value of all coalitions, such exibility would strengthen requirements for non-emptiness. It would yield complications but, in our view, few more insights.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the cooperative provision of economic activities that are globally benecial but locally harmful in an explicit spatial model. Examples include facilities such as landlls, waste treatment plants or polluting utilities, which require that people living in the neighborhood be compensated. When communities can be excluded from using the facilities, free-riding is not a problem like in standard localized public-good provision problems. In our framework, the exclusion of the neighboring communities is the main obstacle to cooperation. It sets upper bounds on compensations, which together with the participation constraints, determine whether a global cooperative solution exists. That is, if the core of the cooperative game is non-empty. A least-core index is computed to test the existence of a core solution. Its denition is robust to several assumptions on the value function in this cooperative game with externalities. It can be estimated in practice.
As mentioned in the introduction, our investigation of the NIMBY problem using cooperative game theory formalizes bargaining à la Coase in economies with externalities. If, when the core is empty, the parties involved fail to implement the project, the Coase theorem does not hold. In the bargaining process, property rights have been assigned to the polluters because a facility could be built without the consent of the neighboring communities.
Under other assignments of property rights, the core might be non-empty. In particular,
it is easy to show that the core is never empty under the polluter-pays principle: if the communities building the facility are forced to compensate all neighboring communities for the damages, a global and ecient agreement can always be reached. Therefore, in contradiction with another interpretation of Coase's thought, the assignment of property rights could matter for reaching eciency, even in the absence of transaction costs.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1 Let x be an allocation which meets the conditions stated in Proposition 1, that is, the eciency condition (1), individual rationality conditions (2) , and the following lower bounds
We rst show that it satises the core lower bounds (5) for any arbitrary coalition. Let
If T is a non-building coalition, we have v(T ) = 0. ∀i ∈ T , x meets the individual rationality constraint x i ≥ 0. The sum of these constaints yields Condition (5) for T .
If T is a building coalition, we have v(T ) = b(T ) − c(T ). Let us consider j * ∈ argmin j∈T i∈T c ij an optimal site in T and S * =
For every i ∈ N , N \{i} ∈ Y hence j∈N \{i} x j ≥ v(N \{i}). This inequality can be rewritten, using the eciency condition (1), as
From the summation of the latter inequalities for all agents inT \T to inequality (6), we obtain i∈T x i ≥ b(T ) − c(T ) = v(T ). Hence condition (5) holds for T .
We have shown that the core lower bounds can be restricted to coalitions in Y. 
B Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1, the core can be dened as: 
Assumption 3 implies that the saving induced by the withdrawal of a community will never overcome the loss of its benet so for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N,
Hence, this linear program is feasible when Assumption 3 is met (take, for all i ∈ N, x i = 0).
Besides, it is bounded (by N b i for instance) so it admits a nite value. We now show that the individual rationality constraints x i ≥ 0 are non-binding in (LP 1). We start to show that, for any optimal solution, no community pays more than max j∈N \{i 0 } c ji 0 , the highest external cost it can bear. Let x * be an optimal solution to (LP 1) and i 0 ∈ N . Assume that:
We can then increase x * i 0 by some > 0 such that:
Such an increase improves the objective. We shall show that it also leads to a feasible solution. Let S ∈N such that i 0 ∈ S. Because S ∈N , S\{i 0 } also pertains toN (except for the case S = {i 0 }, in which the result is direct). By feasibility of x * , we have:
Summing inequalities (8) and (9), we get:
All the constraints involving x i 0 are met. This contradicts the optimality of x * . Hence, inequality (7) cannot hold by contradiction. We have:
Denoting by j * an optimal host in N \S, we have:
Hence:
From conditions (10) and (11) 
Again, this linear program is bounded and feasible. Therefore, it admits a nite value and so its dual (LP 2 * ):
S:i∈S
Which can be further simplied to:
A necessary and sucient condition for non-emptiness of the core is that the value of (LP 2 * ) is lower than v(N ) = b(N ) − c(N ). This leads to the following condition:
C Discarding Assumption 2 in Proposition 2
If |H| > 1, the proof of Proposition 2 holds. Here we assume |H| = 1 and show that a similar result to Proposition 2 can still be obtained. The dierence lies in the fact that the host can get more than b h in core allocations, which prevents an immediate focus on neighborhoods. However, we show that, as soon as an additional assumption is met, requiring that x h ≤ b h does not alter the least-core value. This allows a focus on neighborhoods. The proof proceeds as the proof of Propositions 1 and 2: we rst discard redundant constraints and simplify non-binding constraints in a linear program related to the emptiness of the core.
Let us denote by h the unique optimal host in N and let x be an allocation which meets the eciency condition (1), individual rationality constraints (2) and the following core lower bounds for every
Where E = {N \S|S ∈
• N and c(N \S) ≤ c(N )} and E h = {S ⊂ N |h ∈ S}.
We rst show that it satises the core lower bounds (12) for any arbitrary coalition. Let
If T is a non-building coalition, we have v(T ) = 0. ∀i ∈ T , x meets the individual rationality constraint x i ≥ 0. The sum of these constraints yields Condition (12) for T .
• N (j * ) ∩ (N \T ), the set of strict neighbors of j * that are not in
, where the third equality comes from the fact that communities inT \T do not belong to the neighborhood of j * by construction. Hence:
The rationality of coalitions N \{i} yields ∀i ∈ N \{h}, −x i ≥ −b i . From the summation of the latter inequalities for all agents inT \T to inequality (13), we obtain 
We now eliminate constraints inĒ h . Let us denote by (LP 3) the former linear program. Let us consider x * as an optimal solution to (LP 3) and let us assume x * h > b h so that we can write x * h = b h + , > 0. At this stage, an additional assumption is required:
This assumption implies that it is always possible to exclude some agents dierent from h and save on the cost of the project. We will show there always exists another optimal solution, x , such that x h ≤ b h . From Assumption 6, there exists S ∈
• N such that h ∈ S and c(N \S) ≤ c(N ). Let us consider S ∪ {h} ∈Ē h ; we have, by feasibility of x * in (LP 3):
Besides the rationality of coalitions N \{i} requires ∀i ∈ S, x * i ≤ b i . Hence, there exists ( i ) i∈S ∈ R |S| + such that, i∈S i = and, for all i ∈ S, x * i ≤ b i − i . Let us dene x as follows:
By construction this solution yields the same objective. We want to show it is feasible as well. Let T S be such that T S ∩ S = ∅ and T S ∈Ē ∪Ē h ∪ {i|i ∈ N }, an arbitrary coalition ofĒ ∪Ē h ∪ {i|i ∈ N } containing elements of S. Three cases arise:
If T S ∈ {i|i ∈ N }, then the associated constraint x i ≤ b i is met by construction.
If T S ∈Ē h , we have, where the rst inequality comes from the fact that i∈T S ∩S i − ≤ 0 and the second is the feasibility of x * in (LP 4):
If T S ∈Ē, T S ∪ {h} ∈Ē h and by feasibility of x * in (LP 4):
Simplifying b h and because i∈T S ∩S i ≤ ,
Because c(N \T S ) ≤ c(N ), the optimal location in N \T S cannot be h. Hence, the withdrawal of h can only lead to a decrease in cost, so that c(N \(T S ∪ {h})) ≤ c(N \T S ).
Finally, we have, for any constraint T S involving elements of S:
This establishes that x is feasible. Hence it is an optimal solution as well. Finally, we can require that x h ≤ b h without altering the value of the linear program. This denes the linear program (LP 4):
It is straightforward to show that, following the introduction of the additional constraint x h ≤ b h , all constraints inĒ h are redundant in (LP 4). Hence (LP 4) can be rewritten:
And, adding some redundant constraints to simplify the notations:
We eventually get an expression similar to the one introduced in Proposition 2: Assumption 2 can be replaced by Assumption 6 provided we impose the additional condition 
D Proof of Corollary 1
In the linear case, Assumption 2 holds, and we explicitly compute the value of I(C). In this section we will use the notion of balanced collections. A collection B of subsets of N is said to be balanced if and only if there exist strictly positive weights χ B = (χ B S ) S∈B such that, for any i ∈ N, S∈N :i∈S χ B S = 1. Denoting by B(N ) the set of balanced collections over N composed of elements ofN only, we can write:
For any S ∈ N , we have the corresponding values: We now explain how to nd such optimal partitions.
First, for any partition involving coalitions in which 2 or n − 1 belongs to a two-agent coalition, we weakly improve on the objective by splitting such coalitions into singletons.
Hence, we can restrict our attention to coalitions in which such communities appear as singletons. The construction of an optimal partition then consists in maximizing the number of coalitions of the form {j ∪ j + 2|j ∈ [1, n − 2]}. In the case n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}, such optimal partitions are trivial as soon as communities 2 and n − 1 appear as singletons. in considering all possible cases. We detail the case n=7. First, we know that there is always an optimal partition containing {2} and {6} as singletons. The value associated with each is δc. The value associated with any other single individual is 0 whereas the value associated with any pair ofN is δc. An optimal partition thus contains as many pairs ofN as possible. This is achieved with the partition P = {{1, 3}, {2}, {4}, {6}, {5, 7}}.
For any n > 7, we know that n can be decomposed as n = 4k + i, k ∈ N and i ∈ 0, 1, 2, 3.
According to this decomposition, an optimal partition can be found by combining the initial patterns above and the iterative pattern presented in Figure 7 which maximizes the value that can be obtained by adding 4 communities to the initial pattern. We eventually nd the following optimal partitions:
And the associated values are:
The condition on δ expressed in Corollary 1 directly follows from the comparison of I(C) with 1.
E Proof of Proposition 3
Let σ = (N, b, C = (c ij ) (i,j)∈N 2 ) and σ + = (N, b, C + = (c + ij ) (i,j)∈N 2 ) be two NIMBY problems meeting Assumptions 1 and 2. Let us respectively dene c and v (respectively c + and v + ) the cost and the value function in the problem σ (resp. σ + ). We assume
Let (LP 3 * ) and (LP 3 * + ) be the linear programs dening respectively I(C) and I(C + ) and let χ * be an optimal solution to (LP 3 * ). χ * is feasible in (LP 3 * + ). Besides, because C ≤ C + and c(N ) = c + (N ), we have ∀S ∈ N , (1 −
c(N ) ), so the value of the linear program (LP 3 * + ) taken at χ * is not lower than I(C). Therefore, its optimal value I(C + ) cannot be lower than I(C).
F Proof of Proposition 5
Let R be a restriction and v R its associated characteristic function. We want to show that under Assumptions 1, 2, 4 and 5, the R-core is non-empty if and only if I(C) ≥ 1. We extend the proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
First, we eliminate redundant constraints in the system dening the core. We distinguish between building and non-building coalitions. N B = {T ⊂ N |b(T ) < c(T )} is the set of non-building coalitions. Replicating the proof of Proposition 1, the constraints for building coalitions can be restricted to {N \S|S ∈N }. However, the constraints for non-building coalitions cannot be reduced to individual rationality: an allocation x is in the R-core C R if and only if i∈N x i = v(N ) (14) ∀S ∈ N B, i∈S x i ≥ v R (S) (15) ∀i ∈ N,x i ≥ b i 
where the constraints (15) 
Such an increase improves on the objective. We shall show that it also leads to a feasible solution.
Let S ∈N with at least two communities, such that i 0 ∈ S. Because S ∈N , S\{i 0 } also pertains toN . By feasibility of x * , we have:
Summing inequalities (19) and ( In this case, we additionally have to show that constraints in N B are met, which is straightforward. All the constraints involving x i 0 are met. This contradicts the optimality of x * .
Hence, inequality (18) cannot hold by contradiction. We have: 
